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1 Gemma Corradi Fiumara’s Spontaneity. A Psychoanalytic Inquiry can be considered a claim
for  authentic  life  through  a  psycho-philosophical  approach  as  well  as  an  essential
contribution  to  the  question  of  human spontaneity  and  the  related  conceptions  of
authenticity and creativity.1
2 The book seeks to introduce the notion of spontaneity into a deterministic and causal
psychoanalytic approach which might sound at first as an exotic feature in a scientific
context, where the ability to evaluate the effects of a cause in strictly concrete terms is
supposed to play a primary role.2 As the Author stresses in the first pages, spontaneity
is  nevertheless  to  be  regarded  as  a  fundamental  thrust  that  should  be  taken  into
account in any quest for human psychic life: “Though it may not often seem so, each of
us  is  already  in  the  midst  of  a  life of  passionate,  personal  quests.  Although  these
pursuits may only be expressed in a rudimentary way, they nonetheless inspire our
inner lives: if you want to do something badly enough, you just do it and worry later”
(2).  Her  work  then  can  be  thought  of  as  an  attempt  to  establish  spontaneity  as  a
paradoxical  substratum  to  action,  an  essential  non-rationalistic  and  ‘non-rational’
character of human being which should not be looked at as a negation of rationality but
as an important element for a creative authentic self-formation, since his early states.
According  to  the  Author  the  deterministic  point of  view of  current  psychoanalytic
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literature assumes that the genesis of  pathological  narcissism depends on the early
relational vicissitudes in which the child has no active role in self-formation. Corradi
Fiumara nevertheless engages in providing a finer balance between outer and inner
causes in self-formation, pathology and health, arguing that such affective a balance is
possible if spontaneity is held as a function operating already in the child and not only
in the adult human being. In order to attain this, she suggests to consider the child’s
activity as a pretheoretical and pre-conceptual expression of spontaneity. She admits in
the  child’s  psychic  elaboration  the  existence  of  a  subjective  zone  that  cannot  be
rationalized, where some motivational reasons to act, “not comprehensible in causal
terms” (9), have their basis. Hence, in this way, the active role in which spontaneity
consists,  takes  the  shape  of  a  ‘non-passivity’  in  the  receptivity  (14),  where  the
emotional  pre-theoretical  elaboration  of  life  events  occurs.3 That  does  not  imply  a
rejection  of  the  Freudian  supposedly  deterministic  outlook.  On  the  contrary,  the
Author strives to display in Freud’s thought a number of hints that should possibly
allow  her  to  claim  a  firm  rooting  of  her  findings  on  authenticity  in  the  classical
psychoanalytic ground. She catches in Freud’s description of “transference-love as both
real and unreal” a glimpse of a paradox – although the positivistically-inclined Freud
admittedly would have had a hard time naming it in such a way; moreover she sustains
that  Freud would  have  implicitly  postulated  the  necessary  active  reconstruction of
primitive states of imitation in the mature states of the self (15).4
3 Besides  making  sure  that  a  strict  compatibility  with  Freudian  psychoanalysis  is
maintained,  Corradi  Fiumara’s  work  seeks  to  bring  in  it  a  new  way  to  psychic
unconscious phenomena that compensates the lack of deterministic reductionism, the
latter being perceived by her as unfit to account for freedom and intentionality (7). She
is faced here with two interlocking approaches: on one hand she seeks to delineate the
process of allowing the ‘I’ to emerge in the personality; on the other hand she strives to
understand  spontaneity,  pointing  out  that  its  elusive  character  should  not  be
considered  as  a  failure  of  theory.  Rather,  it  is  a  sign  “of  what  spontaneity  is:  an
essential and perhaps most important quality of psychic life, sustaining all forms of
creativity”  (4).  However,  as  spontaneity  has  been  considered  traditionally  an
insubstantial mental feature, Corradi Fiumara needs also to recast the method in order
to shape again the concept, an effort which ends up in the Author reaching the more
general question of authenticity in psychic life. Assuming that spontaneity is far from
being easily comprehensible, she suggests that we can make a step towards spontaneity
only  if  we  became  able  to  get  along  with  our  problems,  instead  of  aiming  to  a
‘perfectionist’ approach to life where everything has to be rationalized. In other words,
the Author says, we ought to begin to accept our limits and problems as the Norma of
our  life  to  become  aware  that  spontaneity  is  the  character  of  authenticity,  and
suffering a chance to stop the search for anaesthetizing the phobia of distress and pain
(16).
4 In  the  second  chapter  Corradi  Fiumara  focuses  on  the  ego’s  active  propensity  to
transform  and  influence  the  internalized  psychic  objects  through  its  previous
attributions and intentional responses. As is well known the process of ‘internalization’
is at the basis of self-formation. In this process fantasy would be the element allowing
that the exchange between inner and outer world occurs determining psychic growth.
However, the suspect with which classic methodology surrounds the idea of such an
active role of the subject has much to do with the obscurity of some active internal
processes. As noted by the Author, also “the term ‘fantasy’ commonly carries the sense
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of  something  unreal,  whereas  action  in  fantasy  is  real  psychological  activity;  it  is
activity that affects the emotional processes within the subject” (12-3). This does not
mean that fantasy works to escape from a strangling mechanism of identification: the
individual  sets  himself  up through a  creative  elaboration of  his  experiences  and it
seems that in such elaboration there are some pristine filtering functions at work that
determine which outer objects and in which way they should be internalized.
5 According to Corradi Fiumara, we can theoretically define two ways of internalization:
the passive/mechanical  way,  in  which the introjection of  outer  objects  inhibits  the
subject personality; and the active way, where the subject works on re-creating the
objects and then acts for governing mental events. Hence, the psychoanalytic problem
must be restated in this way: how could the outer mechanically incorporated object
become autonomous and may rule us from within? The work of active internalization
has to confront primitive identifications of osmosis and contagion, the first stages of
identity construction of the self. Here the individual has a passive relationship to the
outer world and often goes through a period of intense submission, which is also at the
basis of a narcissistic condition. If these phases were not actively reconstructed in the
subsequent states of maturity, there could be not a self. A mere imitation of the other,
following a work of active introjection badly carried out, would cause the formation of
a mind-like agent, whose actions cannot be deemed authentic.
6 The ability to recognize narcissistic currents is of great importance also for analysts
who are often too imbued with abstract concepts to observe the other’s intrapersonal
vicissitudes. Frequently an analyst fails to identify inner mind-like agents, which can
cause  narcissistic  confusion  for  him  and  the  patient.  In  these  situations,  Corradi
Fiumara remarks, a ‘shift’ is necessary to confront the patient, because his subjective 
experience “cannot  be  properly  expressed in  our  ordinary vocabulary.  It  has  to  be
noted in the successful analysands, felt, attended to and allowed to show itself; it is,
moreover,  an  experience  that  ranges  from being  totally  pleasing  to  being  severely
painful” (14). The therapist ought to begin to act spontaneously toward the mechanisms
of reaction of the analysand to understand him correctly, and this is possible only if the
therapist is aware of his own self.5
7 Corradi Fiumara tackles the notion of ‘paradox’ in the third chapter (with a specific
reference to Winnicott’s thought – a reference actually showing throughout the entire
book),  and  stresses  its  positive  function  for  the  psychoanalytic  process:  “the
psychological  use  of  the  term perhaps  indicates  the  converse,  or  the  other  side  of
paradox – namely the fact that something that seems absurd, inconceivable, incredible
turns out to be maturational, beneficial or enlightening” (25). Even though it is a notion
not sufficiently defined in psychoanalysis, we may nevertheless find a precursor of the
paradox in the transitional phenomena, as they represent an attempt to actively link
diverging elements in the child. From this point of view, the wrong assumptions and
principles at the basis of paradoxical reasoning may also be fruitfully involved to form
the integrity of the self, because of the capability of psychoanalytic paradox to strain
our minds. Thus, in a psychopoietic process where inner forces sustain psychological
self-formation, the challenge of considering paradox an opportunity instead of a mere
conflict  situation  should  be  accepted,  and self-integration  be  regarded  not  as  a
synthesis but as the ability to tolerate every new paradox arising within the self. As
Jung had already assumed about the role of complexes in psyche and Mead had argued
concerning the self as a creative role-taking in the game of life, we are not an ideal
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unity,  our  integration  does  not  imply  “a  fictional  Cartesian  unity,  but  rather,  the
growing ability to benevolently call those voices ‘I’, and not to disidentify with any one
of them” (31).  In this way, the plurivocity of the “I” becomes a richness of the self
giving voice to a spontaneous self which comprehends its dividedness.
8 The  fourth  chapter  resumes  and  further  extends  some  observations  on  subjective
agency the Author already made in her previous Mind’s Affective Life.6 According to her,
the creative subjective agency was implicitly assumed as one of the roots of classical
psychoanalytic  theory,  but  at  the  same  time  the  fact  that  such  a  presupposition
remained  unexpressed  reveals  the  incoherence  of  the  theoretical  background  of
psychoanalysis.  Corradi  Fiumara  emphasizes  the  necessity  that  the  human being  is
conceived as a compound of determination and agency. Moving from that assumption,
a question arises about the option between constriction and spontaneity:  either we
suppose some inner principle  of  subjective  agency or,  on the contrary,  we have to
admit our determinations through the influence of “our nature/nurture constraints”
(37).  The subject’s  active  valuation and orientation is  the only  inner  possibility  for
spontaneity, based firstly on the subject’s emotional activity, which in turn determines
the relation of the self  to the world and to others,  firstly to its  caretakers.  If  good
parenting lacks, the self might recede to a sense of narcissistic passivity, that “can be
silently interwoven with any sorts of language games (or jeux de massacre) and forms of
life (or ways to extinction)” (38). A particular care should be paid to the possibility of a
passive and inertial way of life. Narcissistic passivity in fact causes a kind of ‘psychic
deadness’, the absence of any emotionally creative centre. In this regard, according to
Corradi Fiumara psychoanalysis can be used not only as a way to enforce caring, but
also as a means to handle a lack of active responses towards outer stimuli.  Since it
results  in  a  process  of  ‘decreation’  of  the  psyche,  psychoanalysis  might  allow  the
subject to regain its authentic self, in a way that the ‘I’ would eventually fulfill features
of its own like initiative and intentionality. Certainly, this sort of ‘birth’ can only derive
from a “serious inner experience of the individual who dares to be born” (43), and that
is not simple. It might happen that the subject gets in touch with its feelings without
focusing them properly, i.e. without perceiving a psyche that moves it ahead in the
path of its psychic growth. The fear of change, of abandoning, of losing something,
could  push  the  subject  to  resist  new  illuminating  insights,  preferring  a  passive
‘epistemology’  to  what  Corradi  Fiumara  had  called  in  her  Mind’s  Affective  Life,
‘epistemophily’ – a desire of thinking and knowing (44).7 But knowledge per se does not
allow us to live authentically. Only a process which helps us to give voice to the desire
of re-elaborating our life experiences over and over again may consent to develop an
authentic self. Corradi Fiumara argues that in a healing process the therapist must pay
attention to the risk that an external object ends up acting as a source of mimetic
subjection.  The  mechanism  of  transfert  opens  the  door  to  the  possibility  that  the
analysands  abandon  their  passion  for  their  profound  identity  “in  order  to  create
spurious harmony with the theorizing that they most admire” (46). This is a risk in
which a therapist too like-minded with the authorial authorities of psychoanalysis may
be entangled:  passivity  may endanger  him as  well,  since  his  profession requires  to
maintain a number of standards, settled by norms which can turn out to be a cause of
stiffness – such norms will always present themselves as already accomplished answers
to whatever questions may be under discussion. To overcome this danger the therapist
has to become aware that he is a person, and that his profession too is a particular way
“to being alive” (47), in the sense that two tendencies are paradoxically at stake, one
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being the necessity that the therapist refers to the general principles of theory and to
the  clinical  technique,  and  the  other  the  need  that  the  individual  person  emerges
properly. And it is only in this paradoxical circumstance that the therapist can help the
psychic growth of analysand.
9 Corradi  Fiumara,  then,  raises  the  question about  how,  from the  perspective  of  the
pathological problem of entitlement and its psychoanalytic remedies, the subject can
be spontaneous in spite of the historical circumstances or a mental illness. A subject is
entitled to narcissistic compensations because of an early inadequate care by parents
causing traumatic vicissitudes. He establishes that the others have had loving cares he
has not, thus motivating the fact that he is an ‘exception.’ With the excuse to have
suffered enough in the past, the subject is pathologically overdependent on a privileged
position which prevents any development of spontaneity. In such people the need for
compensation takes many forms; one of the most striking is an apparent absence of
guilt  and  the  absolute  conviction  of  being  privileged.  Moreover,  Corradi  Fiumara
stresses,  in  this  kind  of  self-righteous  individual  “there  seems  to  be  an  ongoing
pleasure that is even drawn from emotionally destructive and sadistic currents” (59) in
a way that his relationships tend to become critical, for the other is drawn into the
subject’s  narcissistic  outlook.  Compensation may produce  pseudo-actions  instead of
authentic  actions.  Pseudo-agency  is  in  fact  related  to  compensation  in  narcissistic
subjects, i.e. to a number of ways of exerting psychic influence as a consequence of
failed attempts to get over passivity through the modification of their behaviour or
their principles. Between principles, which shape one’s way of perceiving actions, and
the life experiences, potentially capable of reshaping principles, there is a gap where
one can turn out be either a  potential  agent or a subject  entitled to exert  control,
incorporation and extortion on account of all frustrations endured. Pseudo-actions may
produce some pathological benefits because, paraphrasing Corradi Fiumara, a subject
firmly  convinced  that  he  deserves  what  he  wants  is  usually  more  ‘successful’  in
obtaining it  (63).  However,  by doing this  the subject  asphyxiates subjective agency.
Facing the problem of entitlement sometimes means being confronted with a further
aspect,  the feeling of  hatred –  usually  the unavoidable result  of  the subject  having
previously been hated. Corradi Fiumara restates that the analyst should seek a chance
to break that vicious chain by gaining an insight in the self’s entanglement, which can
be achieved expressing interest for the subject’s ongoing internal dialectic processes,
stimulating  the  emersion  of  a  negativistic,  self-pitying,  vengeful  mentality,  and
avoiding  at  the  same  time  to  express  any  judgment:  a  therapist’s  active  and
sympathetic  role  is  essential  to  overcome  the  ‘bad  infinity’  of  narcissistic
compensations.
10 The three brief but crucial following chapters tackle three essential steps for restoring
self’s spontaneity: the function of actions instead of reactions, the question of forgiveness
and the quest for responsibility. In the sixth chapter Corradi Fiumara argues that the
hindrance to understand the nature of others’ actions/reactions and reactions/actions
lies in the fact that there are two ways we can look at those activities. In fact, however
right it may be that reaction is commonly seen in pure causal terms, on the other hand
it would not make sense to look at ‘actions’ in terms of a mere cause-effect model;
rather, it is much more sensible to imply something like teleology of an action or final
causes. From a ‘non-scientific’ point of view like this, we can better understand the
subjective  role  of  desires  and  intentions,  as  well  as  the  subject’s  perception  of  a
situation  as  positive  or  negative  in  view of  his  integrity  and to  carry  out  mindful
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actions. “Thus – Corradi Fiumara stresses –, cognition and desire could ultimately be
defined  in  terms  of  human  acting,  in  the  sense  that  cognition  serves  action  by
processing information, and desire signifies the point and motive of it all”, cognition
and desire being “interwoven aspects of one process” (70-1). Anger too may appear, in
this  context,  as  a  necessary  aspect  of  creation:  if  it  is  metabolized  through
psychoanalytic work, anger might contribute to make the necessary energy available to
act creatively.
11 However, in order to act spontaneously through the purely destructive force of anger
without being overwhelmed by it, we need to be capable of forgiveness. According to the
Author forgiveness is the “constitutive of subjectivity as understood in a new and more
realistic/pragmatic way” (77), which means considering the subject’s act of forgiving
as,  paraphrasing  Arendt,  the  only  reaction  that  acts  anew  retaining  something  of
action.8 Corradi Fiumara does not accept those psychoanalytic models which postulate
the conflict between individual and social order as constitutive of subjectivity. Rather,
she  emphasizes  the  human  capacity  to  generate  relationships  as  one  of  the  most
relevant expressions of creative genius – a ‘genius’ being the inner attitude of doing
extraordinary minimal things beyond the customary realms of patriarchal cultures and
standardizations. She distinguishes between a ‘vast’ inner space of powerful members
and  a  ‘deep’  inner  space  of  powerless  members  of  a  community,  arguing  that  the
geniuses of spontaneity and healing “have less to do with the amplitude of our minds
and more to do with the potential for depths, for seeking our unknown, unthinkable
resources, such as even the ultimate capacity to pity one’s oppressors and to forgive
neglect and abuse” (78). The genius of forgiveness may thus become able to express his
aggressive desires through social-cultural codes. Aggressive desires, feelings of revolt
belong normally in the range of unuttered experience because of the impossibility to
express  them in  a  viable  public  knowledge;  in  such  circumstances  the  genius  may
provide  “the  inspiration  that  allows  ordinary  people  to speak,  even  through  the
degrading clichés of a culture” (79).
12 The  question  of  forgiveness  is  strictly  related  to  the  quest  for  responsibility,  as
forgiveness and responsibility are in fact two sides of the same evolutionary pathway of
the subject: if on the one hand forgiveness is a ‘deep’ dimension of spontaneity, on the
other  responsibility  is  the  expression  of  an  integrated  self,  whereas  ignorance  of
responsibility results from a subject detached from himself. One part of the explanation
for such a detachment lies – as Corradi Fiumara had argued in The Mind’s Affective Life –
in western epistemological tradition, in that it assumes ‘true’ rationality as separated
from the subject’s personal affective life. This leads to a misrepresentation of the ideas
of freedom and responsibility, as in the case of freedom only regarded as a detachment
from  any  sort  of  oppression  like  anger  or  illness:  in  this  way  the  achievement  of
individuation, creativity and responsibility, in short freedom to do something, is staved
off. From this perspective, the ultimate value of the therapeutic process rests in the
appraisal  of  an  ‘unobservational  insight’  instead  of  a  ‘rationalistic,’  more  objective
representation of the self. To support this, Corradi Fiumara goes beyond the classical
psychoanalytic Oedipus myth and highlights the Aeschylus’ myth of Orestes, where she
finds the expression of a multidimensional explanation of the subject’s owning up of
active responsibility.  Corradi Fiumara suggests that there is  nothing like a subject’s
taking responsibility in Oedipus, except his potential admission of a sexual desire. On
the contrary,  when Orestes avenges his  father’s  murder,  he owns up to his  actions
before the assembly of the community, thus claiming courageously accountability for
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his own actions and humbly acknowledging the authority of  the community.  These
actions  –  Corradi  Fiumara  goes  on  –  are  more  revealing  than  the  oedipal  simple
identification with the  father,  in  that  Orestes’  acceptance of  his  own responsibility
requires  also  an  interpersonal  forgiving  background:  “The  act  of  assuming
responsibility – she stresses –, of recognizing subjective agency, and the community’s
attitude  of  forgiveness  appear  the  key  to  maturation  and  development;  it  is  the
transformation  of  a  maddening  vicious  circle  into  a  cumbersome  but  therapeutic
virtuous circle.  This  makes life  difficult  for  everybody,  but  also  makes for  a  richer
human  life”  (90-1).  Hence,  making  a  decision  of  spontaneity  is  also  an  ethical  act
through which the subject recognizes the community’s normative role.
13 As much as forgiveness can be hard to conceptualize – this the conclusion of eighth
chapter –, Corradi Fiumara goes on in ninth chapter to suggest that it is nonetheless in
its roots that a comprehension of our personal affective life as well as the acceptance of
the existence of a bond to our actions may be grasped. Thus, recognizing the richness
in other people’s ‘foreignness’ may be a way to come to terms with the difficulty of that
concept.  Such a  recognition can prove useful  to  accept  our  limits  and develop the
spontaneity we need for a responsible maturation of ourselves through empathy with
the others. In this regard, Corradi Fiumara makes a distinction between ‘empathy’ and
‘sympathy.’ Though these concepts are often used as synonymous (the term ‘empathy’
has  probably  a  more  recent  history),  the  Author  mentions Black’s  and  Gaddini’s
psychoanalytic  works  and  Stein’s  illuminating  phenomenological  analysis  on  the
matter to suggest that these terms do not indicate the same phenomenon: sympathy
refers to a process of one’s affection for the same feeling of another, while ‘empathy’
helps us, as already Freud implicitly argued, to understand “what is inherently foreign 
to our ego in other people” (94). Hence, “empathy is largely unpredictable and also
tends to expand our relational field in a creative way” (94); on the contrary, sympathy
could be considered as a compulsory “natural mechanism” where also most narcissistic
perversions  are  rooted.  The  narcissistic  drive  limits  therefore  the  acceptability  of
psychic  experiences,  since  it  is  not  aimed  at  interdependency,  but  at  sympathetic
manipulated  relations  where  the  subject  strives  to  satisfy  his  infinite  need.9 The
everyday mechanism of identification shows how easily we sympathize with those who
are like us: there is no psychic labour for sympathy, even though such psychically low-
cost  implies  a  bigger  pathological  price,  lacking responsible  maturation of  the self,
lacking spontaneity and autonomy of the personhood. A solution for this would be that
the  one  whom  the  narcissist  wants  to  dominate,  firstly  the  therapist,  might
spontaneously resist domination and break the narcissistic vicious circle, opening the
way for the narcissist to think of himself as a separate being. However, even in this case
the therapist would not be immune from a pathological sympathetic mechanism, as a
risk arises that the therapist succumbs to a stereotyped idea of ‘emphatic’ connection,
fueling a ‘relation’  that includes only minimal areas of  the other’s  personality,  and
results  in  a  delusion  of  convergence  and  homogenization.  The  same  risk  of
homogenization  is  easily  found  in  transitional  experiences,  where  the  sympathetic
attitude of the authorial authority with infants may stifle their psychic life. This is the
case when it is not possible to empathize with childrens’ emotions and psychic states,
and their expressions are denied. However, Corradi Fiumara notes, “in order to develop
one’s spontaneity, we may have to migrate in search of novel linguistic communities
that  allow for  new styles  of  psychic  survival  and  creative  action”  (100).  Whenever
“superior managers of language and culture” take over the exploration of our inner
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world they atrophy our inner life. On the contrary, what makes us authentic selves is
our capacity to develop new forms of interrelation and new points of view about the
community and the possibility  of  acquiring new knowledge.  It  is  then necessary to
promote the formation of new metaphors for us to see and say what we want to pursue.
In order to attain this, a more empathic inclination should be developed that unlike
sympathy and immediate fulfillment, seeks a wider grasp of the relation, reaching the
differences as well as the complex connections between us and other’s independent
self.  Empathy  requires  a  work  which  implies  a  willingness  to  open  ourselves  to
something beyond us,  beyond our sympathetic  ‘certainty’:  “We could say –  Corradi
Fiumara writes – that the way any two, or more, interlocutors know that they have
entered  real  empathy,  and  that  it  is  distinct  from  the  more  usual  exchanges  of
sympathy,  is  that  these  experiences,  paradoxically,  may  even  appear  unfamiliar,
unexpected in their specific form and timing, or ‘strange’; it may even be confusing as
to what is happening or what should be done. And yet the contact becomes very intense
subjectively, as in the more transformational moments of truth” (104-5).
14 In the last chapter Corradi Fiumara points out a psychic attitude that is also necessary
for cultivating spontaneity: self-decreation. As for self-formation and self-preservation,
care should be paid that such a decreation is properly developed for the sake of the
self’s health. However, that is not simple. The belief that the Ego has to be fortified
through a “logocentric, logocratic society” casts discredit on the values related to inner
spontaneity by denying its  existence.  Such a ‘rationalistic’  misunderstanding of  the
human being considers self-decreation as an Ego’s debility, whereas, as already noted
in The Other Side of Language: A Philosophy of Listening, Corradi Fiumara makes the point
that at the basis of our culture there is an erroneous use of the notions of power and
strength,10 and that “it is a lack of inner strength that in fact is trying to regain its
balance through a search, as secret as it is unrestrainable, for power or for some link
with power. The most archaic interactions seem to dominate in a culture as a result of
the insufficient strength of powerful egos,  however admirable they may be in their
expressive discourses” (114). From this perspective, the psychoanalytic process might
be a precious opportunity to overcome the old oppressive way of life. This can occur on
condition that both the analyst and the analysand become capable of self-decreation,
the latter in that he “gradually come to struggle to relinquish parts of his own self for
the sake of a more rewarding adaptation,” the former by striving “to let go of his view
of things for the sake of a new insight into the confrontation” (115).
15 In  Spontaneity.  A  Psychoanalytic  Inquiry  Corradi  Fiumara  sketches  a  new  perspective
where to look at human agency from, moving back and forth between psychoanalytic
theories  and  philosophical  reflections,  conjoining  analytical,  etymological  and
theoretical concepts thanks to fruitful intuitions. Therefore this book is suitable to both
the analyst and the philosopher. The analyst will find useful suggestions to avoid the
risk of acting on the narcissistic belief that he has ‘the’ right therapeutic solution, and
other hints that will help him to realize whether he is making use of outer authorial
authorities  preventing  proper  contacts  with  analysand’s  authentic  self.  Recovering
from a pathological condition means in fact that the therapist understands the crucial
role of a ‘spontaneous’ listening as a way to gain a constructive point of view from
which to see the relation with the analysand. On the other hand, this book is also suited
to  the  philosopher  because  it  may prove useful  to  prevent  the  risk  of  sticking too
tightly to disciplinary boundaries, which might end up vitiating the sense for vitality he
needs to confront this matter.11 Corradi Fiumara shows the possibility that a critical
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engagement  along  with  self-acting  and  social  practice  is  developed  through  an
authentic  philosophical  liveliness.  Her  pluralistic  approach  to  psychoanalytic
questions, a proof of her pragmatic mood, contemplates the value of the individual’s
active  inner  life  in  relation  to  the  surrounding  world.  On  the  one  hand  the
psychoanalytic point of view is necessary to change the balance of the subject’s internal
forces – rational and non-rational – in order to remove the inner conditions that block
a healthy relationship towards the surrounding environment and the others; on the
other  hand  this  changing  must  also  consider  environmental  conditions,  and  in
particular  the  inescapable  interrelation  of  human  beings.  Only  through an  active
acknowledgment  of  social  and  cultural  conditions  for  self-formation  and  the
community’s attitude of forgiveness, a more human, flexible and compassionate form
of psychic exploration can be reached, that enables the self to get rid (at least partly) of
dominant culture imagery.
16 However,  a  couple  of  questions  remain  about  how  a  subject  can  begin  to  act
spontaneously in spite of a mental illness, in other words how he can engage himself in
a serious inner process; and, secondly, how a subject can become able to accept his own
limits in a social environment that strongly urges individuals to overcome every limit
that  might  restrain  them,  in  Corradi  Fiumara’s  words  how  we  can  decolonize  our
psyches. As noted by the Author, Freud had already suggested that, as much as it is the
psychoanalyst who analyzes the patient, the patient is the one who has to synthesize
the analysis. However, she argues, though Freud himself had put forth the question
about how the subject can achieve the synthesis and why he may fail to reach it, this is
a crucial question which is really rarely asked by psychoanalysis theorists. This book
tries to provide an answer through the perspective of the therapeutic process, pointing
out also the limits and risks in which the analyst can fall. Nonetheless, it should be
added  that  for  any  attempt  to  achieve  a  synthesis,  be  it  to  overcome pathological
dynamics or simply to start considering one’s own reactions in order to restore his
spontaneity, a spontaneous primitive choice is the prerequisite, something that any theory
or therapeutic process has to admit as an assumption, without which they cannot work.
By growing aware of the responsibility for our psychic life, we learn to become capable
of  actions  instead of  reactions and we learn the capability  of  forgiveness.  However,
before this may occur, an act of acceptance is required, since self-acceptance appears to
be the primary creative attitude. Accepting our self means first of all making a choice
that brings out the primary paradox: we have to choose spontaneously to start the path
towards spontaneity. The difference between acting spontaneously or as a like-minded
agent is rooted in this first action.  In other words, to seek spontaneity is first of all,
deciding to face “a challenge,  a  ‘play’  that is  both creatively playful  and extremely
serious” (28). Creatively playful because we ‘play to create’ ourselves, extremely serious
because the first step to spontaneity relates to its consequences, the most important of
which  is  the  acceptance  of  our  responsibility  to  face  the  outer  world.12 Making  a
decision for spontaneity is, as Calcaterra stresses about authenticity in human action,
“to assume the responsibility for everything that these engagements imply.”13 As we
have seen, to assume responsibility is to recognize the authority of the community.
However, a subject’s responsibility is strictly related to the community’s attitude of
forgiveness,  i.e.  the  community’s  capability  to  help  self-development.  As  a
consequence, a last question remains, maybe more ethical than psychoanalytical, about
how the community’s attitude of forgiveness can be increased, how the cultural value
of forgiveness can be fueled, specially in the face of a model of society that promotes
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indifference to the others instead of forgiveness, the phobia of ‘foreignness’ instead of
its empathic connections. As we have seen here, it is not possible to escape from the
limits  of  community’s  environment,  i.e.  from  the  influence  of  others,  such  limits
expressing the normative character of social environment. Even our will of innovation
must face community’s rules.14 It  seems, then, that we ought to find out reasons to
‘engage ourselves’ in our ‘very environment.’ And in order to attain this, we need to
assume the ethical value of public dimension as the basis of our acting, but at the same
time  “a  cultural  atmosphere  of  forgiveness”  (79)  is  required.  Hence,  the  quest  for
spontaneity seems to be also a question about the ethical values our communities ought
to encourage.  However,  this  is  an ethical  question that  cannot  be  taken up in  this
review.
NOTES
1. In the last number of EJPAP, Rosa M. Calcaterra stressed the importance to restore a reflection
on the notion of ‘authenticity,’  “in order to clarify the basic structure of that relationship to
one’s  self  through which,  in  concrete  experience,  one constructs  self-understanding and the
image of oneself to offer to others” (Rosa M. Calcaterra (2010), “Epistemology of the self in a
pragmatic mood,” European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, II (1), 13). Moreover, in
the first number of the EJPAP Vincent Colapietro dealt with Hans Joas’s The Creativity of Action (V.
Colapietro  (2009),  “A Revised Portrait  of  Human Agency,”  European  Journal  of  Pragmatism  and
American Philosophy, I (1), 1-24).
2. Corradi  Fiumara has already dealt  with the question of  self-formation and self-expression
through the analysis of different ‘uses’ and limits of language and their roles on the process of
personhood development. She stressed the necessity for an active and more authentic subject’s
interpretation of the world and the others strictly interrelated to the crucial role of emotions (Cf.
G. C. Fiumara (2001), The Mind’s Affective Life. A Psychoanalytic and Philosophical Inquiry, Brunner-
Routledge,  East  Sussex;  (1995),  The  Metaphoric  Process.  Connetions  between  Language  and  Life,
London, Routledge, (part. ch. X). See also (2005), La funzione del linguaggio nella costituzione del sé, in
R. M. Calcaterra (ed.), Semiotica e fenomenologia del sé, Torino, Nino Aragno, 69-89).
3. Corradi Fiumara mainly refers to Winnicott on the topic, as well as to Modell’s theory about
the need of a private self also in the infant: “alongside an infant’s need for relatedness there is, in
fact, the need for a private space” (43). The recognition of “the active propensity of the early
ego” and the intentional response of the infant to life events has been already developed in
Klein’s theory on the development of conscience in the child.  According to Corradi Fiumara,
Symington  too  suggests  that  both  the  trauma  and  the  individual’s  response  to  it  cause
narcissistic pathologies (11-3).
4. She refers to the Freudian quasi-theory of Nachträglichkeit, as expressed in a letter to Fliess in
which Freud argued that between two successive epochs of life “a translation of the psychic
material must take place” (Letters to Fliess dated 6 December 1896, cited in Spontaneity, p. 122n).
The subject’s translation of the psychic material plays a fundamental role in the self-formation.
However, the psychological and philosophical implications of the concept of Nachträglichkeit as it
is conceived in Freud’s theories of pathogenesis and of psychotherapy present difficulties and
confusions in Freud’s works as well as in post-freudian renditions of the notion (see between
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others  H. Thomä  &  N. Cheshire  (1991),  “Freud’s  Nachträglichkeit  and  Strachey’s  ‘Deferred
Action’:  Trauma,  Constructions  and  the  Direction  of  Causality,”  The  International  Review  of
Psychoanalysis  18,  407-29;  J. Laplanche  (1999),  “Notes  sur  l’après-coup,”  in  Entre  séduction  et
inspiration:  l’homme,  Paris,  PUF.  See  also  the  voice  “Nachträglichkeit,”  in  J. Laplanche  & J.-
B. Pontalis, Vocabulaire de la psychoanalyse, Paris, PUF, 1967).
5. She writes: “[o]nly the development of awareness, in the sense that we are cognizant of our
own representation of ourselves, can aid in the direction of integrated internal relations […].
Integrity of the self could be achieved when virtually all parts of the personality are encircled by
creative acts of awareness and acceptance” (19).
6. In The Mind’s Affective Life. A Psychoanalytic and Philosophical Inquiry Corradi Fiumara dealt with
human ‘emotion’  and its  correlation to the formation of  human activity and knowledge as a
crucial  question  for  both  psychoanalysis  theories  and  philosophic  inquiries,  arguing  the
necessity of a interrelation between objective epistemology and heterogeneous epistemophily.
7. The  desire  of  knowing  is  expressed  in  terms  “of  exploring  diversity,  complexity  and
spontaneity,” that is to look at other creatures as sources of richness (47).
8. H. Arendt (1998), The Human Condition, Chicago/London, University of Chicago Press, 241 (cit. in
Spontaneity: 77).
9. Corradi Fiumara hypothesizes that as sympathy is considered a “natural mechanism,” it could
be also related to ‘mirror neurons,’ through which sympathy could be explained as derived from
the soma automatic reactions.
10. She  noted the  ambiguous  uses  of  power  and  strength,  in  stressing  that  the  power  is
connected with the subordination of other’s will to one own’s will, the strength is connected with
an ability to do something.
11. Cf. V. Colapietro, A Revised Portrait of Human Agency, 1.
12. As she writes, “acting spontaneously involves endurance and responsibility” (74).
13. R.  M. Calcaterra,  Epistemology of  the Self  in  a  Pragmatic  Mood,  22.  Calcaterra refers here to
Larmore’s  theory  on  ‘authenticity’  through  an  ethical  approach  (see  C. Larmore  (2004),  Les
pratiques du moi, Paris, PUF. English translation, Practices of the Self, Chicago, University Press of
Chicago, 2010).
14. George Herbert Mead defined the community’s rules as the “generalized other,” that is the
mechanism by which the community gains control “over the conduct of its individual members”
(G. H. Mead (1967 [1934]), Mind, Self and Society, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 155).
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